This paper focuses on the issue of spatial differentiation stimulated by dissimilarities in the economic structure of regions/settlements.After the transition period, two distinct models of economic revival and development emerged in Hungary. One, embodied by Budapest, is that prosperity rests on the tertiary sector. However, industrial output outweighs all other economic indices in regional differentiation in the remainder of the country, as a consequence of the investment strategies of multinational companies.The main factors, agents and impacts on regional differentiation in this nonknoweldge-based economic development model are revealed.
Two models of economic growth in the second half of the 1990s
Political changes and the evolution of the market economy in the 1990s were paralleled by increasing regional disparities in all the former state socialist countries. In the course of these changes, production in the different regions was re-evaluated in relation to both internal and external conditions.This largely determined the course of economic stabilization and development in the individual regions. For this reason, from the perspective of regional development, the 1990s transition can be divided into two phases.
First, the transition of the political system was followed by a sharp economic slump, and -as empirical studies have shown (Gorzelak et al., 1994) -recession and increased regional disparities throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The slump was felt earlier and more rapidly in the regions that, traditionally, had been underdeveloped, whose economies were less competitive, or whose geographical locations became unfavourable after 1989. In contrast, local and regional economic decline was more limited, and recovery started earlier (evident in the distribution of foreign direct investments and the establishment of new enterprises) in major provincial towns and in the western region of Hungary (Gorzelak et al., 1994; Tome? and Hampl, 1999; Nemes-Nagy, 2001 ). However, although the depth and duration of the slump varied by country and region within Central and Eastern Europe, it was universal. It is therefore contended that, at the time of the crisis, regional differentiation was essentially 'internal' in origin (resulting mainly from the socialist past of the region), constituting a generalized and essentially cyclical process.
Secondly, in most of the new democracies, the period of absolute economic decline came to an end after a few years, and the second half of the 1990s was generally a period of stabilization and growth. However, local conditions and local economic strategies played a significant role in this, so that economic growth continued to be differentiated nationally and regionally. In the next section of the paper, we demonstrate that the internal regional differentiation of the former state socialist countries can be accounted for mostly by structural factors in this phase, but that external factors (mostly foreign direct investment) also play a decisive role.
In Hungary, one of the most important processes determining the regional 'winners' or 'losers' was the sectoral transformation of the economy.There were two different models of 'successful' regional development. Budapest and its metropolitan region, which has been the most economically advanced part of the country for several decades, follows the general model of the 'core' economies (Hallet, 2000) : in the local economy, the tertiary sector, especially skillsintensive modern business and personal services, became a dynamic and highly competitive sector.The capital city and its metropolitan area, accounting for a quarter of the national population, has 50-80 percent of the output of market services as well as dominating research and development. In the short term, this is the only region in Hungary with the potential for knowledge-based spatial development. Budapest's GDP per capita (at PPS) was equivalent to some 90 percent of the EU average at the end of the decade. In contrast, the remainder of the country is a periphery which barely achieves 40 percent of the EU average. The economic basis of the centre-periphery dichotomy, which is the most significant dimension of Hungarian regional inequalities, is that the tertiary sector has been the engine of regional differentiation for more than two decades.
In the 1990s, particularly in the second half of the decade, increasing regional differences were informed by a new dimension, an east-west dichotomy. Later in this paper, we focus on the underlying economic reasons for this, notably the regionally uneven development of manufacturing. The origins of this strong spatial dichotomy in manufacturing development is undoubtedly exogenous: in the context of globalization, multinational companies in the more developed countries have relocated manufacturing to the periphery in order to realize economies of scale, primarily to reduce costs (Krugman, 1991; Hallet, 2000) . For the time being, however, this industrial, mass-production-based development is the engine of Hungarian economic growth. Since the mid-1990s, this has been the most significant influence on regional change, to the extent that the rate of growth in the North West has outstripped that in Budapest. Therefore, the north-western part of the country has become increasingly economically advanced in relation to other regions, which generally have become slightly more homogeneous in terms of development indices, such as the value of GDP/capita and personal incomes (Nemes-Nagy, 2001 ). Similar trends can be observed in other East European countries (Smith and Ferencíková, 1998) . However, the process has been especially rapid in Hungary, and the role of the manufacturing sector in the national economy and its regional differentiation has been unusually important.This can be attributed to the liberal Hungarian privatization strategy, as well as the rapid evolution of the market economy, the low rate (18 percent) of corporate tax, and the high level of FDI (particularly,'green-field' investments that have a major impact on regional economic development). This paper explores the reasons, characteristics and outcomes of this relationship between industrialization and regional development.
Increasing regional differences in the second half of the 1990s in Hungary here: GDP per capita and income changes in the 19 counties (corresponding to NUTS-III level in EU nomenclature). Inequalities were measured using the Hoover index. 1 By 1999, GDP had regained the level of 1989 at the national level, but, regional differences had increased considerably (Figure 1 ). Incomes still lagged behind 1989 levels, but inequalities continue to increase.
The 'winners' in these changes, the areas of growth, are the Central Region (around Budapest), and the North West, namely Northern-Transdanubia (Figure 2 ). In the latter region, the pace of GDP growth was twice as great as the national average (Table 1) . At the same time, all the rest of the country lagged behind, with barely any increase in gross value added. Most of the 'winners' in the 1990s had been among the most advanced regions under central planning, but in the past decade the spatial structure of Hungary has became less mosaic-like. Although the differences between small regions, as well as among towns and small villages remain significant, a sharp divide between the developing western and less developed eastern regions is increasingly evident (Figure 1) . Therefore, the regional dimension has become stronger in the system of social inequalities, and the scale of regional differences surpasses those recorded in Western European countries (Nemes-Nagy, 2001 ).
Differentiated industrial development in the 1990s
In the early years of the transition, industry was more crisis-prone than the other sectors of the economy. Between 1989 and 1992, domestic industrial output decreased by 29 percent, whereas total GDP decreased by only 18 percent. However, the recovery commenced in the industrial sector and has continued since 1993. Growth has been particularly marked since 1997, exceeding 10 percent a year. Industrial output increased 1.5 times between 1992 and 1998, while services output only rose 15 percent, and agricultural production continued to decline. In this period almost 60 percent of Hungarian economic growth was in the industrial sector, so that there has been a steady increase in its share of gross value added and employment. The growth of production is highly uneven between regions and subsectors alike. The leading subsector is unquestionably engineering which experienced a sevenfold increase in production between 1992 and 2000, whereas production in other branches barely grew at all or stagnated ( Figure 3 ). Overall, some 80-90 percent of industrial output growth was in engineering. By 1999, there had been major changes in the structure of industry: the food and chemical industries had lost their previous leading position to engineering.Yet, even in 1998, only 10 percent of Hungarian GDP came from engineering, although it accounted for one half of GDP growth. This demonstrated that Hungarian economic development is highly uneven and, also, that Hungary, using Wallerstein's term (1983) , is on the semi-periphery of the international economic system. Despite this, both the pace of development in engineering and the speed of the transformation of the economic structure are remarkable by international standards.
In parallel with sectoral restructuring, regional differences in industrial production have increased considerably in recent years.The Hoover index, which measures cross-county differences in the value of industrial output per person, almost trebled between 1992 and 1999 in only seven years, while the spatial concentration of agriculture and services remained largely unchanged. The regional differences in industrial value added are almost three times greater than those for value added in the tertiary sector.
In contrast to other East Central European countries, the spatial structure of industry has changed radically in Hungary (Tomes and Hampl, 1999) . At the end of the 19th century there was a northeast-southwest 'industrial axis', which included Budapest. Although the dominance of this axis gradually weakened from the 1960s, it survived until the end of the 1980s. In the 1990s, however, the western part of Hungary, especially the North West, has become the most important industrial area. In the seven years after 1992, industrial output trebled after the initial deep crisis in the transition. Industrial growth reached 40-60 percent a year in some counties. Consequently, industry has regained its position as the largest economic sector in northwest Hungary, providing approximately one half of GDP. In the same period, industrial production expanded by only 20-25 percent in other regions, including Budapest, and had hardly regained the levels prevailing 10 years earlier; the manufacturing sector only accounts for approximately 20-30 percent of production in these regions. One of the most telling differences is that the value of industrial output per person in north-west Hungary is three or four times greater than in any other region. A statistical exploration of industrial and regional trends
The statistical relationship between regional differentiation and industrial change in Hungary can be explored in several ways, but here we present a simple regression model. There is an unusually strong (0.78) positive correlation between the value of the GDP per capita and the share of industry in GDP at county level, if Budapest is excluded. 2 It is even more surprising that, in the case of the tertiary sector, this correlation is of the same magnitude but is negative. This is mainly due to spatial differences among the subsectors within the tertiary sector. Except for Budapest, public services (education, health service, administration etc.) account for a substantial proportion of employment and output, particularly, in the less developed eastern areas, serving to moderate the effects of the transition crisis. The role of industry in regional development increases continuously. Between 1995 and 1998, the correlation between the counties' industrial output and the increase in their GDP was +0.86.The values of the correlations with income and employment have also increased over time, and the regression lines have become steeper, year by year. 3 Differences in industrial development have become the decisive factor in regional income inequalities: whereas in 1992 the county-level correlation between industrial output and income per capita was relatively low, +0.34, this had increased to +0.80 by 1998. This strong correlation is partly based on differences in productivity and salaries, but industrial development mostly affects incomes through employment rate differences. Because of the new jobs created by the new industrial capacities, the economic activity rate is much higher in the northwestern part of Hungary than in the other regions.
Engineering, which has been the basis of national industrial development, is concentrated in the North West, and was the basis of its economic dynamism. This region only accounted for 20 percent of Hungarian engineering capacity in the 1980s, but by 1998 the proportion had increased to 65 percent (Table 1) . This was mainly due to the influx of international capital. In the 1990s, most foreign capital arrived in Hungary through the privatization of formerly state-owned companies, but growth was relatively modest in the majority of these privatized firms because the new owners were mainly interested in securing the former markets and capacities of these Hungarian firms. Some 80 percent of the improvement in Hungarian industrial output came from greenfield investments. These had a distinctive regional distribution, with two-thirds being located in the north-western region. The affiliated companies of Audi, IBM, Philips, General Motors, General Electric, Suzuki, Ford, and Nokia have become Hungary's largest firms. These were mainly capital-intensive investments, which created relatively few jobs. However, the level of concentration in the North West was such that, at present, there are labour shortages in the largest industrial centres which are constraining further industrial development.
The role of foreign investors and state policies
The primary aim of industrial investors in Hungary was to reduce production costs for their Western European markets (Krugman, 1991) . This favoured the North West, given its location and good motorway and railway links.Wages are 5 to 10 times lower than the Western European average, skilled labour is available, and some larger cities already had strong industrial traditions. Excepting proximity to these companies' European headquarters and main markets, similar production conditions could be found in most other regions in the country. Clearly, therefore, geographical location played a dominant role in investors' decision making. The other endogenous factors that are usually included in models which seek to explain the concentration of manufacturing (for example, Krugman, 1991) proved to be of secondary importance in Hungary. Although, the largest 'greenfield' investments were concentrated in the largest cities (Györ and Székesfehérvár) with strong industrial traditions, massive plants were also established near the western border in small towns which had little previous industrial capacity.
Moreover, despite the fact that there are growing production constraints (especially, labour shortages) in the North West, region, most new investors still seek to locate in these industrial districts, although they have to bear the costs of transporting their workers daily over distances of 50-70 kilometres.
The state has also sought to promote inward investment in a number of ways:
1. Most engineering plants were declared customsfree zones, so that two-thirds of all engineering exports are currently customs-free. 2. Most factories were built in industrial parks, subsidized by the state, which were granted special tax benefits. 3. Firms investing more than HUF1b (approximately $3m) are granted lengthy tax holidays. 4. Multinational enterprises receive the largest share of state subsidies for economic development. 5. The local state tends to exempt most major investors from some local taxes.
Multinational firms optimize these opportunities, 4 which means that most state expenditure supports the development of the North West. For example, almost 80 percent of the exports of the Hungarian customs-free zones originate from this region (Table  1) . Therefore, in contradiction of the declared aims of the state's economic and regional strategies, large multinational companies were subsidized rather than small and medium-sized Hungarian enterprises. While this can be understood in the context of the global rush for investment, it still means that the state contributed to regional divergence. Moreover, regional policy had little impact on these differences, partly due to the limited budget available (accounting for only 0.5 percent of GDP) which is fragmented among diverse national and local state funds (Horváth, 1999) . In addition, there is no specific regional policy dimension to the allocation of other resources by the state. Consequently, the regional 'winners' have become even more prosperous, have enhanced economic performances, and have secured disproportionate shares of state funds (Nemes-Nagy, 2001). The typical products produced in the new factories (e.g. cars, televisions, monitors, hard disks, and many types of electronic and vehicle components) represent 'traded goods', which have a high degree of concentration and clustering everywhere in the world (Hallet, 2000) . But, despite relatively modern levels of installed technology, the intellectual value added in these products is minimal because the relocation of production was not accompanied by the establishment of research and development units. All this indicates the peripheral status of the North West in international economic relations. The massive economic growth in the region, together with low rates of unemployment and a lack of social conflict (Nemes-Nagy, 2001), justifies the view that, in the peripheral countries, there are non-knowledge-based models of regional development which are exogenously controlled (Hallin and Malmberg, 1996) .
As in other East Central European countries (Smith and Ferencíková, 1998) , most companies in Hungary that are controlled by foreign owners produce exclusively for export markets. They have international networks of suppliers and their new factories have few Hungarian suppliers. As a result, even the development of the North West is vulnerable, given its dependency on external influences. However, the new investments are relatively isolated within the Hungarian economy, and most have only very limited influence on the development of other sectors and regions. Despite the efforts of the Hungarian government, the rate of sourcing from Hungarian suppliers does not exceed 10-20 percent 5 in 'greenfield' plants, while the first regional industrial cluster was established only in 2001. In this way, many of the basic elements of sustainable development in the prosperous industrial areas are absent.
Conclusions
On the basis of the analysis presented here, we conclude that industrialization had a decisive role in economic growth and regional differentiation in Hungary in the 1990s. With the exception of the larger Budapest region, GDP growth resulted from 'greenfield' inward investments in the engineering industry in the north-western region. This was reinforced by several forms of state redistribution, such as government subsidies, and preferential taxes and customs duties, which far exceeded the funds allocated to regional policy. Thus far, this industrybased model of regional development has proved too successful in many respects. Moreover, this has been the only successful regional strategy in Hungary which was not based on specific local potential.
The process however, is not a specifically Hungarian phenomenon for it is embedded into European and global economic processes (Krugman, 1991; Hallin and Malmberg 1996; Smith and Ferencíková, 1998 .) It is no accident, then, that the doubts and discussions surrounding this Hungarian model of transformation are similar to those relating to industrial-based development in the EU (Hudson et al., 1997; Hallet, 2000) . First, this model rests on conditions (permanently increasing demand, proximity to potential markets, good accessibility, state subsidies, etc.) that mean it cannot be transferred mechanically to most underdeveloped regions. Besides, its regional impact is such that it is expected to increase rather than decrease regional inequalities in the long run. Second, the success of the re-industrialized regions is mainly exogenous in origin, being strongly dependent on the conjuncture of cycles in the world economy (a favourable economic climate in the main European markets for the goods produced in north-west Hungarian firms), and the strategies of multinational companies. Finally, the development is not self-sustaining because it did not generate growth in all sectors and has not involved most local enterprises.
Recently, there have been some indications of new trends. The concentration of new industrial investment has decreased slightly: although new industrial concentrations have not emerged, new plants have been established in south-west and eastern Hungary (most were established along the motorways or in the largest cities). However, the recent trends can be seen as a spin-off of industrial development in north-west Hungary: there was considerable growth in the output of local smallscale enterprises, related (indirectly) to new industries, and the range and quality of advanced producer services was also enhanced. Furthermore, a few multinational firms have established high-tech production plants (for example, Microsoft is planning to invest in manufacturing its playing-console, X-BOX) and R&D units in Hungary (for example, Nokia). At the same time, other international investors (e.g. Mannesmann and Solectron) have closed down their units in Hungary and moved production further east (e.g. Mannesmann to Southeast Asia, and Solectron to Romania).
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For the time being, however, it seems that such investments are exceptional and do not significantly modify current trends. It is unlikely that the relationship between regional development and economic structure in Hungary will change substantially in the near future, unless there is severe recession in the European economy.
Notes
1 The Hoover index is one of the simplest onedimensional index number of regional concentration. This indicates what proportion of a particular quantity (the GDP of a country, for example) should be redeployed among a group of regions in order to secure an equal distribution (corresponding to another quantity -population is usually used as the control group).The formula is: H = 1/2*∑abs((x i / ∑x)-(f i / ∑f)), where x i stands for the quantity under examination, and f i stands for the amount of quantity in the i th area unit, whose distribution is compared. 2 In the case of Budapest, which has the highest GDP per capita, the very different, postindustrial character of development is clearly indicated by the fact that the industrial proportion of the GDP is only 18%; this is smaller than that of any county although the industry in Budapest is considered to be relatively efficient. 3 One example illustrates this: in 1995, the coefficient of the regression line, which demonstrates the value of GDP per capita as a function of the share of industry in GDP in the 19 Hungarian counties, was a=1.08, and the value of the explained square of variance was R 2 =0.25; whereas in 1998 the values were a=1.74, R 2 =0.61. 4 A telling example of this is that Audi Hungarian Motor Ltd., which has the highest return from sales of all the Hungarian companies, is only the 43rd biggest local taxpayer on its own company seat, in the city of Györ. However, after their tax-free period ended in 2000, in return for another major investment they gained full exemption from taxes for the next 10 years. 5 The only significant exception is the Suzuki plant:
Hungarian suppliers account for around 50-60% of their production.This can be explained by a corporate strategy that aims to increase their share in the car market of the EU.
